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Abstract—The growing popularity of smart mobile devices
such as smartphones and tablets has made them an attractive
target for cyber-criminals, resulting in a rapidly growing and
evolving mobile threat as attackers experiment with new business
models by targeting mobile users. With the emergence of the first
large-scale mobile botnets, the core network has also become
vulnerable to distributed denial-of-service attacks such as the
signaling attack. Furthermore, complementary access methods
such as Wi-Fi and femtocells introduce additional vulnerabilities
for the mobile users as well as the core network. In this paper,
we present the NEMESYS approach to smart mobile network
security. The goal of the NEMESYS project is to develop novel
security technologies for seamless service provisioning in the
smart mobile ecosystem, and to improve mobile network security
through a better understanding of the threat landscape. To this
purpose, NEMESYS will collect and analyze information about
the nature of cyber-attacks targeting smart mobile devices and the
core network so that appropriate counter-measures can be taken.
We are developing a data collection infrastructure that incorpo-
rates virtualized mobile honeypots and honeyclients in order to
gather, detect and provide early warning of mobile attacks and
understand the modus operandi of cyber-criminals that target
mobile devices. By correlating the extracted information with
known attack patterns from wireline networks, we plan to reveal
and identify the possible shift in the way that cyber-criminals
launch attacks against smart mobile devices.
Keywords—Mobile network security, femtocell security, anomaly
detection, visual analytics, virtual mobile client honeypot.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones, tablets, and similar smart mobile devices
have been greatly successful as personal communication and
computing devices owing to their always-on connectivity, mo-
bility, usability, and operating systems that enable a vast market
of applications tailored for the needs of mobile users. Smart
devices are undeniably taking over the mobile device market,
and this trend is not expected to slow down in the near future.
Table I gives the number of mobile devices shipped worldwide
in 2012 based on data from Canalys [1]. The data shows that
smartphones and tablets represented 42% of all mobile devices
shipped in 2012, and their combined market share is expected
to grow to 66% by 2016. The significance of these numbers is
TABLE I: The number of mobile devices shipped worldwide in 2012
and forecast for 2016, in millions of units, according to Canalys (Feb.
2013) [1].
Device type 2012 shipments 2016 shipments 2012–2016 CAGR
Basic phone 122.0 58.0 −17.0%
Feature phone 770.8 660.9 −3.8%
Smartphone 694.8 1, 342.5 17.9%
Tablet 114.6 383.5 35.3%
Notebook 215.7 169.1 −5.9%
Netbook 18.3 0.3 −64.2%
Total 1, 936.2 2, 614.2 7.8%
highlighted by the fact that among all consumer devices, only
the television has had such a fast market penetration rate in
the USA [2]. Furthermore, while smartphones represented only
18% of total global mobile phones in use in 2012, they were
responsible for 92% of total global mobile phone traffic [3].
With both the device market share and the amount of data
traffic due to smart devices expected to continue to grow
significantly, their importance is evident in the current and
future mobile landscape.
Smart devices increasingly store and provide access to
a range of personal, corporate, financial and security-related
data. While the availability and ease of access to such data via
different types of network connections (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular),
the ability to download, install and use mobile applications,
and the practicality of using networked services while on the
go make the smart mobile device an inseparable companion
to the modern man, they also provide the perfect breeding
ground for malicious software. Cyber-criminals have not had
continuous access to such varied sources of personal and
financial data before the advent of the smartphone. Increasing
use of mobile payments presents a new area to exploit, and
attackers have already devised covert ways to make direct
financial gain from the mobile users, e.g. via premium calls
and SMS [5]. Furthermore, the use of multiple communica-
tion technologies in smart devices allows attackers to cross
service boundaries. For example, an attack carried out over
Wi-Fi would allow the attacker to launch attacks over the
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(a) The number of detected Android malware in 2012. The data
shows a rapid increase in malware, especially in Q3-Q4 2012,
which was due to aggressive adware.
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Fig. 1: Android malware in 2012, based on data provided by TrendLabs [4]
mobile phone network. In addition to exposing the mobile
user to heterogeneous attack vectors, the increasing use of
complementary access to the mobile core network, via Wi-Fi
and femtocells, introduces new vulnerabilities to the core
network [6]. The amount of data carried over complementary
access should not be underestimated; according to Cisco [3],
429 petabytes per month of global mobile data was offloaded
onto the fixed network through Wi-Fi or femtocell radio access,
which represents 33% of total mobile traffic in 2012. Cisco
also estimates that mobile data offload will reach 9.6 exabytes
per month by 2017, which will be 46% of total mobile traffic.
Smart mobile devices are also increasingly at the center
of security systems for managing small or large emergen-
cies in built environments, or during sports or entertainment
events [7,8], and they are also used increasingly for online
search of difficult-to-get sensitive information [9,10]. Thus
such technologies will necessarily be targeted and may be
breached in conjunction with other physical or cyber attacks, as
a means of disrupting safety and confidentiality of individuals
and emergency responders [11]–[13].
In order to address the growing mobile threat, there is
an urgent need to detect, analyze and understand the new
vulnerabilities and threats in the smart mobile ecosystem,
which are a result of the evolution of mobile networks and
smart devices, the changing way users interact with technology,
the popularity of smart devices, and the heterogeneity of the
wireless interfaces, supported platforms and offered services.
In order to advance in the fast moving field of cyber-security
and to counter existing and potential mobile threats, we need to
be proactive and work on predicting threats and vulnerabilities
to build our defenses before threats materialize. To this pur-
pose, the EU FP7 NEMESYS project1 will develop a novel
security framework to gather and analyze information about
1http://www.nemesys-project.eu/nemesys/
the nature of cyber-attacks targeting mobile devices and the
mobile core network, as well as identify and predict abnormal
behaviour observed on smart mobile devices and the mobile
network so that appropriate countermeasures can be taken. We
aim to understand the modus operandi of cyber-criminals, and
to identify and reveal the possible shift in the way they launch
attacks against mobile devices through root cause analysis and
correlation of new findings with known patterns of attacks on
wireline networks.
II. THE CURRENT MOBILE THREAT LANDSCAPE
Smart devices are open to both traditional and mobile-
specific threats due to the multiple roles smart mobile devices
play and the heterogeneity of mobile communication technolo-
gies and networked services [14]. Among the traditional threats
that smart mobile devices face, we include physical attacks
that require physical access to the device, device-independent
attacks such as eavesdropping on the wireless medium or man-
in-the-middle attacks, e-mail-based spam and phishing, and IP-
based attacks. Current IP-based attacks encountered on mobile
devices [15] have been found to be largely similar to those
on non-mobile devices [16,17], but we are more interested
in the traits of attacks that are tailored specifically for mobile
devices. With the growing popularity of smart devices, mobile-
specific threats have evolved from SMS/MMS-based denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks [18,19] to more sophisticated attacks that
usually come in the form of malware and target both the core
network and the mobile users. The ability of smart devices to
install and run applications not only from official markets but
also from unknown sources exposes them to malware [5,20],
and while the mobile malware threat is not new [21], it is
clearly evolving and growing as attackers experiment with new
business models by targeting mobile users [22,23]. We next
provide a taxonomy of mobile malware based on behavioral
classification, and present an overview of malware detection
techniques.
A. Mobile Malware
Android has been the most targeted mobile platform in
2012, with almost 99% of all encountered mobile malware
being designed for Android [24]. The number of malicious
Android applications detected by Kaspersky Lab in 2012 was
more than 35, 000, which reflects a six-fold increase from
2011 [23]. Figure 1a shows the rapid growth of Android
malware in 2012 based on data from TrendLabs [4], which
shows the significance of the growing mobile malware threat.
2012 has also seen the emergence of the first mobile bot-
nets [24]. A botnet is a collection of Internet-connected devices
acting together to perform tasks, often under the control of a
command and control server. In wireline networks, malicious
botnets are used to generate various forms of spam, phish-
ing, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Mobile
botnets extend such capability to cellular networks, give cyber-
criminals the advantages of control and adaptability, and pose
a significant threat to the mobile core network as they could be
used to launch debilitating signaling-based DDoS attacks [25]–
[28].
Mobile malware uses various infection vectors in order to
gain access to the device; the top two main categories of attacks
based on the vulnerabilities they use are:
• Exploiting hardware or software vulnerabilities of de-
vices to completely bypass the user and instal mal-
ware. Some of the exploits used to attack smart de-
vices are near field communication (NFC) technology,
third-party kernel drivers, Android firmware vulnera-
bilities, and mobile web browsers. For example, some
malicious websites use mobile browser exploits to
install malware on the device without any user interac-
tion other than visiting the site. Android firmware and
third-party driver exploits have been used by malware
to elevate their privileges and thus gain root access to
the device, allowing them to practically do anything
they want without the user’s knowledge [29].
• Social engineering is by far the most common method
used to infect smart mobile devices, where users
are “tricked” into installing the malware themselves.
Social engineering includes all techniques that ex-
ploit the human user, such as phishing, application
repackaging, etc., in order to infect the device. Social
engineering is popular since it does not require any
technical investment by the attacker, i.e. the iden-
tification of a new exploit and the development of
a delivery system that uses it. Upcoming malware
will continue to employ social engineering in new
ways; for example, we have already witnessed the first
malicious QR codes, which need to be scanned by the
user for their activation.
Independently of how it infects the device, once the malware
is installed, it performs one or more malicious activities, which
are classified in Table II according to their behavior. Figure 1b
shows the distribution of malware types for the top ten Android
malware families in 2012, based on data from TrendLabs [4].
The data shows that some malware families exhibit multiple
malicious activities (e.g. both premimum service abuse and
data stealing), and that premium service abuse has been the
favorite malware type, most probably because it is simple to
TABLE II: Malware behavioral classification.
Activity Description
Stealing user information Steals user information and credentials. The most
commonly targeted data are the contact list, IMEI
and IMSI numbers, API authentication keys, bank-
ing credentials, user’s location, network operator,
phone ID and model, phone number, and text
messages.
Monitoring Tracks user’s location, records conversations, takes
photos. Spyware is considered to exhibit this type
of behavior.
Adware Presents unwanted advertisements to the user.
Most mobile adware have evolved to incorpo-
rate other types of behavior, such as monitoring
user activity, especially browsing behavior, and
stealing user information. Malicious advertisement
networks are increasingly finding their way into
legitimate applications and being used as infection
vectors.
Premimum service abuse Sends premium SMS/MMS, makes premium calls,
subscribes the user to premium services without
the user’s knowledge. Cyber-criminals often make
direct financial gain from such premium service
abuse.
Click fraud Generates “clicks” on ads shown on websites
and applications, generating indirect financial gain
to the cyber-criminal through payment from the
advertisement networks.
Search engine optimization Manipulates the search results shown on the mo-
bile browser and other applications to improve
website rankings in search engine results.
SMS and e-mail spam Sends spam SMS and e-mail either to the user’s
contacts or to a specified list of people. Could be
used for phishing attacks.
Malicious downloading Downloads malicious content onto the device.
Mainly used to evade detection by malware de-
tectors and the user.
Botclient Turns the device into a botclient that receives
commands from a remote command and control
server. Once part of a mobile botnet, the device
can be used to launch a variety of attacks, ranging
from spam to DDoS attacks on the network.
Rooting Roots the device to allow execution of otherwise
restricted commands and programs. Malware that
has root access potentially has full control of the
device.
Ransom Locks the device and demands a ransom to be paid
in order to unlock the device.
Destruction Causes physical damage by deleting important
files or personal information.
Denial-of-service Launches a denial-of-service attack either on the
mobile device itself or on the core network. The
mobile device may be attacked by repeatedly
switching the device off or depleting the battery.
create and allows a direct source of revenue for the cyber-
criminal. It is closely followed by adware, which generates
indirect profit through advertisement fraud. Malicious down-
loaders appear to be popular malware delivery methods since
they can evade detection by malware detectors and do not
alarm the user at installation time by requesting many high-
level privileges.
B. Malware Detection Techniques
The traditional approach to malware detection is signature-
based, where signatures for identified malware are extracted
and used to detect new infections of the same malware on
other devices. While this can be very effective for controlling
an outbreak, it cannot defend against malware unless samples
have already been obtained and analyzed. Therefore, new
and unknown malware cannot be detected via signature-based
approaches. In order to detect previously unknown malware,
behavioral methods are useful in which the activities of an
application are analyzed via either static or dynamic analysis.
Static analysis provides a quick and efficient way to detect mal-
ware without executing them, but they are ultimately limited
in their effectiveness unless the source code for the application
is available. Unlike static analysis, dynamic analysis methods
execute the application code in an isolated environment, for
example a virtual machine or a sandbox, so its behavior can
be directly observed. Dynamic analysis techniques include
function call monitoring, function parameter analysis, infor-
mation flow tracking, and instruction tracing. An overview of
mobile malware detection methods is presented in [30], and
a more comprehensive survey is given by [31]. In the rest of
this section, we will only consider behavior-based detection
methods.
Based on where the detection is performed, we can classify
malware detection methods into three categories. Client-side
detectors reside in the mobile device, but are constrained by
its limited physical resources, especially battery. Network-side
detection methods analyze mobile network traffic from many
users and offer a complementary means for detecting attacks
targeting mobile users. They can be used in conjunction with
client-side methods to improve detection rates, and provide a
broad view of malicious activities within a carrier’s network,
enabling detection of anomalous behavior that would not be
visible on a per user basis. However, network-based methods
are limited in that they can only monitor and analyze mobile
traffic that goes through the cellular network, and therefore
may not be suitable for certain malware types, such as malware
that exclusively uses Wi-Fi for communication. Cloud-based
detection offers a trade-off between network-level analysis and
on-device security by offloading intensive security analysis and
computations to the cloud while monitoring internal mobile
device events as well as different types of wireless communi-
cations from many users. However, cloud-based solutions can
only protect those users that install the application and require
a large number of subscribers in order to identify large-scale
events, while network-based detection does not require the user
to do anything as all detection is performed using data available
to the network operator.
III. THE NEMESYS APPROACH
Despite recent advances in mobile security, large gaps
remain in our understanding of the new and future threats
and vulnerabilities in the smart mobile ecosystem. Our initial
research has identified the following open issues with respect
to the general problem of cyber threats against smart mobile
devices:
- Missing infrastructure for collecting attack traces. With-
out an infrastructure to collect attack traces against mobile
devices, we will not be able to detect, analyze and understand
the evolving attack strategies employed by cyber-criminals.
These are crucial in order to develop effective mitigation
strategies and to provide seamless services in the smart mobile
ecosystem.
- Virtualization. By leveraging advances in mobile virtu-
alization technology, we can protect mobile users from the
consequences of malware by appropriately restricting access
to device functionality. Virtualization would also allow an easy
way to reset mobile devices to a state before infection.
- Mobile honeypot development. Honeypots are success-
fully used in wired networks in order to study the strategies
of attackers and to protect production systems from attacks.
However, the development of mobile honeypots is still at
an early stage. For example, the mobile honeypot presented
in [32] can connect to the Internet only over Wi-Fi or a
wired connection. Although the mobile honeypot presented
in [15] can connect to a UMTS network via a USB dongle, the
honeypot uses desktop computers to emulate mobile devices.
We aim to address the deficiencies of these early efforts
by developing a high-interaction mobile honeypot using real
mobile devices.
- New potential for exploiting security vulnerabilities
through mobile botnets. While botnets are a well-known phe-
nomenon in the wired Internet, we have just witnessed the
first mobile botnets in 2012. Mobile botnets pose interesting
questions as to their capabilities and uses since smart mobile
devices possess many abilities not present on a desktop com-
puter. Such mobile botnets could be used to attack mobile users
(e.g. SMS spam) and the core network (e.g. DDoS attack);
the ability of a large number of mobile devices to effectively
attack the core network has been demonstrated in recent cases
of legitimate but poorly-designed mobile applications. We need
to explore the new threats posed by the emergence of mobile
botnets in more detail.
- Adaptability of cyber-criminals and rapidly changing
cyber-crime tactics. Cyber-criminals have become adept at
modifying their strategies and tactics as methods are developed
to counter their activities. Thus, security solutions should rely
less on signatures and instead adopt other forms of detection.
- New types of attacks that cross service, platform and
network boundaries. Identification of anomalous behavior
within a large set of heterogeneous data is difficult and
time-consuming, particularly across layers. Statistical analysis
is further challenged by rare anomalous events in massive
amounts of data.
- Attack attribution and understanding of the cyber-
criminals’ modus operandi. The selection of the best mitiga-
tion strategy requires understanding of new phenomena and
recognizing changes in how the malicious actors operate. This
requires that attacks are analyzed in a detailed way, in order
to “attribute” responsibility to an exact attacker or to protect
the true targets.
In the EU FP7 NEMESYS project, we are developing
a data collection, visualization and analysis infrastructure
(Fig. 2) in order to address these open issues. The core of
this architecture consists of a data collection infrastructure
that incorporates high-interaction virtualized mobile honeypots
and honeyclients in order to gather data regarding mobile
attacks. The collected data is enriched by the data collection
infrastructure through interaction with external sources and
made available to anomaly detection, visualization and analysis
modules running on the mobile network operator’s site. The
purpose of the anomaly detection mechanisms is to detect
deviations from normal behaviour of mobile users and the
core network in real-time. These mechanisms will utilize
charging data records (CDRs) for the users and control-plane
protocol data, combined with enriched mobile attack traces
made available by the data collection infrastructure. In addition
to monitoring abnormal behaviour of users connected to the
core network through the radio access network, the architecture
contains a module that performs anomaly detection within the
femtocell complementary access system.
Enriched attack traces and normal behaviour statistics from
the data collection infrastructure and the output of the anomaly
detection module are fed into the visualization and analysis
module. The visualization and analysis module will aid in
the detection of existing and emerging threats in the mobile
ecosystem through attack attribution, root cause identification,
and correlation of observed mobile attacks with known attack
patterns. It will present large sets of data related to the
observed attacks from heterogeneous sources and facilitate the
role of the security analyst in reasoning, hypothesis testing
and decision making. We describe the components of the
NEMESYS architecture in the following sections in more
detail.
A. Virtualized Mobile Client Honeypot
Honeypots are networked computer system elements that
are designed to be attacked and compromised so we can learn
about the methods employed by the attackers [33]. Traditional
honeypots are servers that passively wait to be attacked,
whereas client honeypots are security devices that actively
search for malware, compromised websites and other forms of
attacks. High-interaction client honeypots are fully functional,
realistic client systems and they generally do not impose
any limitations on the attacker other than those required for
containing the attack within the compromised system. Despite
their complexity and maintenance difficulty, high-interaction
client honeypots are effective at detecting unknown attacks
and they are harder to detect by the attacker [33]. They also
enable in-depth analysis of the attacks during and after the
attack has taken place.
As part of NEMESYS, we are developing a high-
interaction virtualized client honeypot for the Android mobile
platform in order to attract and collect mobile attack traces.
We have chosen Android considering its popularity among
mobile users and the extremely high ratio of malware targeting
Android. Our virtualization technology logically partitions the
physical device into two virtual machines (VMs): the honeypot
VM and the infrastructure VM. The honeypot VM will host
the largely unmodified mobile device operating system, and
it will not have direct access to the device’s communication
hardware. The infrastructure VM will mediate all access to
the communication hardware, and employ sensors to wiretap
any communication and detect suspicious behaviour. It will
also provide the event monitoring, logging and filesystem
snapshot facilities, as well as transmit threat information to
the NEMESYS data collection infrastructure. It will host a
lightweight malware detection module in order to identify
malicious applications running on the honeypot VM. For this
purpose, both signature-based and behaviour-based approaches
will be considered. In order to improve the efficiency of
malware detection, we will identify and prioritize the most
important attributes in the system state space to monitor.
Our virtualization technology will ensure that an attack is
confined within the compromised device and that it will not
put other devices in the network at risk. Furthermore, through
this approach, we will be able to stop malware from abusing
premium services and from subscribing the user to services
without her knowledge. Thus, the user will be spared from
any financial distress that may arise as a result of using
the mobile honeypot. The virtualization solution also enables
taking full snapshots of the honeypot VM filesystem for further
forensic analysis of an attack, as well as improving honeypot
maintenance since a compromised honeypot could be restored
more quickly.
Our initial research has shown that the infection vector
of most mobile malware is social engineering, where users
are “tricked” into installing the malware themselves. This
observation has led us to the conclusion that the user should not
be ignored in the construction of an effective mobile honeypot.
To this end, we introduce the nomadic honeypot concept,
which utilizes real smartphone hardware with the virtualization
solution that will be developed within NEMESYS [34]. We
plan to deploy nomadic honeypots by handing them out to a
chosen group of volunteers, who will use the honeypot as their
primary mobile device. It will be up to these human users to
get the honeypot infected by visiting malicious sites, installing
dubious applications, and so forth. Traces from malware and
other types of mobile attacks collected and identified through
the nomadic honeypots will be provided to the data collection
infrastructure, which is described next.
B. Data Collection Infrastructure
The data collection infrastructure will gather and store
mobile attack traces that will be provided by the virtualized
mobile client honeypot and the honeyclient, and combine them
with data from the mobile core network and external sources
for enrichment, correlation analysis, and visualization. As an
initial step in the design of this infrastructure, we are identify-
ing available external data sources relating to wireline network
attacks which will enable correlation of data from multiple
heterogeneous sources. Examples of such data sources are the
SGNET [35], HARMUR [36], and VirusTotal databases. A
source aggregator is being designed and developed to harvest
and consolidate data from these sources and the NEMESYS
mobile honeypot in a scalable database. Scalable design of
the database is important in order to be able to efficiently
store and handle large heterogeneous data sets. Once data from
multiple sources have been consolidated, they will be enriched
by analyzing the data itself or accessing external sources. For
example, TCP/IP stack fingerprinting in order to identify the
remote machine’s operating system, and clustering of the traces
are passive methods of data enrichment. On the other hand,
DNS reverse name lookup, route tracing, autonomous system
identification, and geo-localization are methods to improve
characterization of remote servers but these functions may
require access to external sources, possibly in real time. As
a final step, the data collection infrastructure will help in the
definition of the appropriate inputs representing normal and
malicious network activity, which will then be used as the
fundamental representation of information in the visualization
and analysis module.
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Fig. 2: The NEMESYS architecture
The honeyclient [37] being developed as part of the data
collection infrastructure is similar in concept to the virtualized
mobile honeypot, but instead of using real hardware and being
driven by real users, the honeyclient uses an Android emulator
driven by artificially generated user input to automate interac-
tion with web sites, application markets and applications in
order to collect mobile attack traces. The honeyclient consists
of a crawler, client, and detector components. The crawler
discovers web sites, application markets and applications of
interest and generates a list of web pages to visit and appli-
cations to download. The client runs the Android emulator
(e.g. on a desktop computer) and processes the list generated
by the crawler, visiting the web sites using a mobile browser
and downloading, installing and executing applications. The
behavior of the applications, e.g. function calls, and changes
to the system as a result of executing the applications are
recorded by the client, which are used by the malware detector
to identify malware. The honeyclient provides data relating
to identified malware and malicious web sites to the data
collection infrastructure.
C. Anomaly Detection Using Control Plane and Billing Data
The anomaly detection module that operates at the mobile
network operator’s site is used for the identification and
prediction of abnormal behavior observed on smart mobile
devices and the mobile network. In addition to user-oriented
attacks, mobile networks are vulnerable to a novel DoS attack
called the signaling attack [25]. Signaling attacks seek to
overload the control plane of the mobile network using low-
rate, low-volume attack traffic, based on the structure and
characteristics of mobile networks. Unlike conventional DoS
attacks that focus on the data plane, the signaling attack creates
havoc in the control plane of a mobile network by repeatedly
triggering radio channel allocations and revocations. In order
to identify such DoS attacks against the mobile network
and attacks against the mobile users in real time, we will
use signaling data from control-plane protocols and sanitized
(anonymized) CDRs from mobile users, respectively. For this
purpose, we will use normal user behavior statistics, as well as
synthetic “typical” user playbacks, to create traces of signaling
events and billing data so as to characterize and extract their
principal statistics such as frequencies, correlations, times
between events, and possible temporal tendencies over short
(milliseconds to seconds) and long (hours to days) intervals.
We will then employ Bayesian techniques such as maximum
likelihood detection, neuronal techniques based on learning,
and a combination of these two in order to design and develop
robust and accurate change detection algorithms to detect the
presence of an attack, and classification algorithms to identify
the type of attack when it is detected with high confidence.
Novel femtocell architectures provide a specific opportu-
nity for user-end observation of network usage, while they
also have specifics for attacks within the femtocells [38]. To
address attacks specific to femtocells, we will conduct a survey
and evaluation of how users may be monitored and attacks
detected within a femtocell, and how these are linked to overall
mobile network events.
A number of novel ideas are also being investigated [39]
such as modeling the signaling and billing network as a
queueing network [40,41] to capture the main events that
involve hundreds of thousands of mobile calls and interactions,
while only a few may be subject to an intrusion or attack
at any given time. Detection of anomalies is studied using
learning with neural networks [42,43] that provide fast low-
order polynomial detection complexity required for massive
real-time data, and the need to detect and respond to threats
in real-time. Such techniques can also benefit from distributed
task decomposition and execution for greater efficiency [44].
Our analytical models and anomaly detection algorithms will
be augmented and validated with simulation tools. As an initial
step, we are developing realistic simulations of UMTS and LTE
networks using the OPNET simulator in order to extract data
regarding control-plane events that take place during normal
mobile communications. Characteristics of these control events
will be used to drive the development of our analytical models.
We will later conduct large-scale mobile network simulations
to validate our mathematical results. Another set of simulations
will focus on user-level events, such as voice calls and packet
communications, and include charging system components to
monitor the use of internal and external network resources.
Such simulations will be used to test the performance of our
real-time and offline anomaly detection methods.
D. Root Cause Analysis, Correlation and Visualization
The role of the visualization and analysis module is to pro-
cess the data obtained from the data collection infrastructure
and the anomaly detection module in order to identify and
reveal correlations between network events, and to provide a
visual analytics framework for the security analyst to perform
hypothesis formulation and testing. The data provided to this
module represents a large and heterogeneous data set that
needs to be presented in a meaningful way to the operator
without overwhelming her or restricting available views and
actions on the data. In addition to mere representation of data,
the visualization and analysis module aims to provide visual
analytics tools to the operator. This task is compounded by
different uses of visualization by the operator: (i) real-time
monitoring of the status of users and the mobile network,
and (ii) exploratory data analysis. For real-time monitoring,
the security status of a large set of mobile users and more
importantly the mobile network need to be presented to the
operator. This includes providing early alerts for abnormal
behaviour, DoS attacks, malware spreading among the users
of the mobile network, etc. The analytics module must also
provide visual analytics tools so the analyst can perform attack
attribution and correlation analysis with the help of algorithms
running in the background.
In order to effectively visualize and explore large sets of
heterogeneous, dynamic, complex data, it is necessary to create
multiple coordinated views of the data that allow a multi-
faceted perception and the discovery of any hidden attributes.
The analysis methods also need to be scalable for early
network alerts and fast access to the underlying data. We will
therefore focus on enabling a real-time analysis framework by
means of incremental analysis and visualization methods [45],
such as multi-level hierarchical screen visualizations that up-
date smoothly rather than showing abrupt changes.
E. Integration and Validation
In order to evaluate and validate the technologies that are
being developed and to demonstrate their impact to interested
parties, NEMESYS will construct a virtual testing environment
based on guidelines provided by our industrial partners that is
as close to a real mobile network as possible within feasibility
limitations. The different modules being developed by various
partners will be integrated in the virtual testing environment,
and validation tests will be conducted based on realistic use-
cases. We aim to use the OPNET simulator as part of the
virtual testing environment in order to conduct simulations of
different types of mobile networks, e.g. UMTS and LTE, and
to drive the large-scale networking experiments.
IV. CONCLUSION
The evolving and growing nature of the mobile threat in the
smart mobile ecosystem is evident from the increasing market-
share of smartphones and tablets, the large amount of data due
to smart devices, and the number of detected mobile malware.
We must therefore address the mobile threat and understand
the new and potential vulnerabilities, threats, and operating
methods of cyber-criminals. NEMESYS will provide new in-
sight into the nature of next generation network security in the
smart mobile ecosystem. The main innovation of NEMESYS
is the research and development of novel security technologies
for the identification and prediction of abnormal behavior
observed on smart mobile devices, as well as for gathering
and analyzing information about the nature of cyber-attacks
targeting mobile devices, so that appropriate countermeasures
can be taken to combat them. It will involve the development
of virtualized honeypots for mobile devices, a data collection
infrastructure, and the introduction of novel attack attribution
and visual analytics technologies for the mining, presentation
and representation of large amounts of heterogeneous data that
are related to the smart mobile ecosystem.
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